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Abstract 
Policy implementation is one of the stages in public policy process. This process often faces diverse issues and challenges. 
This paper aims to analyse models of policy implementation in a governance system in Indonesia. The Indonesian 
government introduced top-down policy implementation system for more than three decades. The fundamental policy 
implementation changes in Indonesia following the fall of the new order regime, Indonesia introduced a bottom-up policy 
implementation system. The bottom-up approach often faces diverse issues and challenges. The failure of implementation in 
the improving welfare program in West Java Provincial triggers researcher’s intention to investigate it. Thus, this paper 
examines the bottom-up model in two different levels of autonomy such as province (provinsi), regencies and municipalities 
(Kabupaten and Kota) in West Java. This research utilizes applies the intensive interviews technique to gather perspectives 
from many informants purposively including civil servant, former government officio, NGOs, target groups, and individuals. 
The qualitative analysis applies the integrated analysis to display the informants’ opinions by integrating their voices in the 
arguments and discussions. The significant contribution of this paper composes of two emphases such as first, the paper 
explicates the bottom-up model integration is unfit to be applied in the improving welfare program in West Java. Second an 
efficient implementation must have remained governed by policy makers, because it will lead to abuse of authority. 
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1. Introduction 
It has been observed that policy implementation is one of 
the major problems confronting developing nations. Within 
the last decade, many countries across the nation have 
struggled to enhance their performance measurements for 
the programs and services they provide to citizens. 
However, these programs many failed. Some public policy 
experts write the cause of the failure of a policy for 
implementation of the policy is the most difficult to 
implement than the process of planning and evaluation. The 
above statement is aligned with the opinion Lewis L. Gunn 
(1978: 76) who said that the implementation of the policy is 
the easiest thing to say, but very difficult to implement. 
Constraints that applicable usually occur as the separate 
connection between policy planners, policy makers and 
policy implementers.1
Various studies have been successful policy 
implementation is done by scholars such as Harold D. 
Lasswell (1951) who initiated argument about a concept of 
fundamental science and use of a 'policies process.' 
Douglas R. Bunker (1972) agreed with Lasswell about the 
implementation process. Martha Derthick (1972) wrote 
about the implementation of policies based on the case of 
failure of the policies in the face of urbanization in the 
 Though a public policy without 
implementation is 'writing no significance' as argued 
Birkland, (2001:177); Edward III (1984:1); Ripley dan 
Franklin (1986); that the absence of effective 
implementation of a policy decision not achieved. Basically 
almost all countries in the world have a good policies 
design but was not successful in the implementation 
process and creates dilemma in making of public policy. 
                                                          
1 Andrew Dunsire (1978) defines that policy failure as a result of the 
"implementing gap", i.e. the dispute or difference scheme with what is 
being implemented. 
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United States. Dethrick argument at agreed by Pressman 
and Wildavsky (1973) who pointed out the implementation 
of the policy on the Economic Development Administration 
(EDA) program in Oakland, California, United State. After 
that, many scholars wrote about the implementation of 
policies and they agreed that the implementation of the 
policy is the spirit to achieve the objective of a policy. 
The study be classified into two approach that is top 
down and bottom up. Both of these approaches have 
different argument and context of its own. Top-downers 
pointed out the policies formulation formed from top to 
bottom by the decision makers and implemented by 
administrators at the central, state, district, village, etc 
(Bardach, 1977; Derthick, 1972; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 
1981, 1983, 1989; [44] and Van Meter and Van Horn, 
1975;).  While bottom-uppers to see that the local 
bureaucrats are the main actors in implementing policies 
that comprehend the negotiation process within the goal 
operators and the bureaucrats can exert strong influence to 
supporting successful policies [15, 16, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 
37]. 
Although different perspective, scholars have argued 
that the successful a policies influenced by efficient 
execution. Despite of policies created completely and 
systematic, it will not necessarily guarantee the 
achievement of the objectives. If the implementation is,2 it 
would lead to a policies failure.3
                                                          
2 The Indonesia planning policies an ongoing basis have been transformed 
direction an excellent. After the reform of the 'authoritarian regime" 
enforce new rules about local government number 22 of 1999, which was 
then amended no. 32 of 2004 about local government is a milestone 
change in public policy mechanisms. Central government control shifted 
for the role of local government. Local governments play an important 
role in the public policy process. Changes in planning from top down 
planning and uniformity into bottom-up planning and diversity to make 
Indonesia have better planning. Policy planning in Indonesia at the present 
starting from MUSRENBANG at neighborhood level up to the country 
level. The development plan involves all elements of the civil society 
whether ordinary public, NGO (non governmental organization), 
journalism, government bureaucracy and the others. MUSRENBANG 
produce an input regarding the needs of development in each region 
involved. MUSRENBANG would otherwise result from the development 
priorities (standard priority) a major implemented by the government. 
This determination of development priorities associated with the 
limitations development budget, a period of implementation, and resources 
development. Results of MUSRENBANG then making government public 
policy in RPJP (rencana pembangunan jangka panjang/long-range 
development plan), RPJM (rencana pembangunan jangka 
menengah/development plan of intermediate term), Renstra (rencana 
strategis/strategic plan) and the other public policy development. 
MUSRENBANG mechanism involving civil society would open up broad 
new hope in public policy development in Indonesia. Changes in policy 
planning from the top down to bottom up to make the provincial and 
district or city became enough effective intellectual actors. Policy planning 
with bottom-up planning mechanism through the MUSRENBANG 
familiar with participatory planning. Investment planning has been 
reviewed by Dudi Sudradjat Abdurachim in his doctoral dissertation titled 
Perencanaan Pendidikan Partisipatif Berbasis Kewilayahan Dalam 
Konteks Otonomi Daerah (2009). 
 This suggests that the 
3 It was argued Edwards III (1984: 9-10) that policy implementation is 
needed to obtain a successful policy to see the causes of the 
ineffectiveness of policy implementation. This is reinforced by the 
statement Grindle (1980: 10) and Quade  (1984: 310) are expecting 
Discovery of configuration and the synergy the various variables which 
implementation of the policy has an important role against 
the success of the policies.4
This paper attempts to delineate the theories of policy 
implementations that focus on local government and the 
bureaucrats in West Java-Indonesia. The research analysis 
clarifies assumptions that have been made by other scholars 
by presenting alternative solutions to problems encountered 
by these agencies. Consideration of these variations is 
essential for the future improvement of not only the 
organizations that deliver welfare services but for the 
legislative process that undergirds them. This paper 
illustrates the results of bureaucrats using discretionary 
action to facilitate their work and to deliver services to 
needy clients. Rigid work environments influence workers’ 
behaviour and significantly impact the clients’ access to 
agency services. Thus, this paper introduces several 
feasible ways to overcome rigid work environments in 
people processing organizations. 
 
 
2. Theory and Methods 
 
a. Theory of Policy Implementation 
Implementation means literally to carry out, accomplish, 
fulfill, produce or complete. Pressman and Wildavsky 
(1973) define implementation in terms of a relationship to 
policy as laid down in official documents (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1984, xxi, xxiii). Policy implementation 
encompasses those actions by public and private 
individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement 
of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions [44]. 
According to Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983:20-21), 
“implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy 
decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can 
also take the form of important executive orders or court 
decisions...”. The starting point is the authoritative 
decision. It implies centrally located actors are seen as most 
relevant to producing desired effects. More concisely, 
O'Toole and his colleagues remark that policy 
implementation refers to the connection between the 
expression of governmental intention and actual result 
(O’Toole and et.al, 1995:43). 
Policy implementation relate to how governments put 
policies into effects [17]. In this sense, it is process 
                                                                                                
determine success or failure of a policy. Then Nakamura and the 
Smallwood (1980: 2) support arguments that the implementation Edward 
above the basis of a basic value. Another argument advanced by Eugene 
Bardach (1991: 3), he describes the difficulties in the implementation of 
policies and the programs that the setting up the public policy appears to 
good on paper is something weird in the policy process. It is convenient to 
formulate in words and the slogans exquisite the ear hears leaders and the 
voters than implement policies that satisfy everyone, including those a 
considered customer. 
4 Rian Nugroho (2008a: 6-436) describes the theory of Pareto's Principle 
of 80/20 with an example the case implementation the public policy in 
which there are 20 per cent are factors that can influence a policy. While a 
basic process the the process of planning can be had only 20% whereas the 
implementation of policies by 60 per cent and the 20 per cent is controlled 
from implementation ground.  
                               Teten AM Engkun                                                                             331 
Scientific Journal of PPI-UKM, Vol. 2. No. 7, 2015 
ISSN No. 2356 - 2536 
 
whereby programs or policies are carried out, the 
translation of plans into practice. While some decisions 
have been made on the general shape of a policy, still 
others are required for it to be set into motion. Funding 
must be allocated, personnel assigned, and rules of 
procedure developed, among other matters (ibid, 185). 
From above discussion, implementation can be 
conceptualized as a process, an output and an outcome. It is 
process of or series of decisions and actions directed 
towards putting a prior authoritative decision into effect. 
The essential characteristic of implementation process, 
then, is the timely and satisfactory performance of certain 
necessary tasks related to carrying out the intent of the law. 
Implementation can also define in terms of outputs or 
extent to which programmatic goals have been satisfied. 
Finally, at the highest level of abstraction, implementation 
outcome implies that there has been some measurable 
change in the larger problem that was addressed by the 
program, public law or judicial decisions (Lester and et. al., 
1995: 87). 
 
b. Top-Down and Bottom-Up Perspectives of Policy 
Implementation 
 
In this essay, top-down and bottom up perspectives of 
policy implementation are used to analyze the status and 
determinants of health policy implementation in Nepal. The 
top- down perspective assumes that policy goals can be 
specified by policy makers, and that the implementation 
can be carried out successfully by setting up certain 
mechanisms (Palumbo & Calista, 1990:13). This 
perspective is ‘policy centered’ and represents the policy 
maker’s views. A vital point is the policy maker capability 
to exercise control over the environment and the 
implementers (Younis & Davidson, 1990: 5-8.). Similarly, 
the bottom-up perspective does not see policy goals and 
factors influencing policy goal attainment as the main 
concern of implementation. The bottom-up perspective 
directs attention to the formal and informal relationships 
constituting the policy sub-systems involved in making and 
implementing policies (Howllet and Ramesh, 2003:190). 
This perspective has as its starting point a problem in 
society. The focus is on individuals and their behaviour, 
and the street-level bureaucrats are central. 
 
Table 1. Differences between top-down and bottom-up 
implementation perspective 
Variables Top-down perspective Bottom-perspective 
Policy decisions Policy makers The street level bureaucrats 
Starting points Statutory language Problem in a society 
Structure Formal Both formal and informal 
Process Purely administrative Networking including 
administrative 
Authority Centralization Decentralization 
Output/Outcomes Prescriptive Descriptive 
Discretion Top level's bureaucrats Bottom-levels' bureaucrats 
 
Top-town perspective puts the emphasis on formal steering 
problems and factors which are easy to manipulate and lead 
to centralization and control. Interest will be directed 
towards such things as funding formulas, formal 
organization structures, and authority relationships among 
administrative units, regulations, and administrative 
controls like budget, planning, and evaluation requirements 
[8]. 
A bottom-up perspective tends to stress the 
importance of decentralization of control contrary to the 
top-down perspective. The street-level bureaucrats are 
considered to have a better understanding of what clients 
need as it is they who have direct contact with the public. 
Michael Lipsky [26] developed a theory on ‘street-level 
bureaucracy’. It focuses on the discretionary decisions that 
each field worker- or ‘street-level bureaucrat’. This 
discretionary role in delivering services or enforcing 
regulations makes street-level bureaucrats essential actors 
in implementing public policies. Indeed, Lipsky claims that 
street level bureaucrats are the real policy makers (Winter, 
2003, 214). 
The main features in the top-down perspectives are 
the emphasis on policies and that directions and control 
originate from "top". One looks at formal steering with 
clearly specified goals and management plans. 
Organizational structure, planning and objective evaluation 
are important, and implementation failure might be due to 
lack of planning, specification and control. 
The bottom-up perspective has as its starting-point a 
problem in society. The focus is on individuals and their 
behavior, and the street-level bureaucrats are central. 
Routine and discretion might cause implementation failure 
together with ineffective behavior, poor interpersonal skills 
and lack of motivation. 
The term “street level bureaucrats” used by Lipsky 
[23, 24, 25, 26], supported by other mainstream scholars 
such as Prottas [35], Weatherley (1980), Elmore [8, 9], and 
Hjern [15] has made a profound contribution to the study of 
frontline workers. Their fundamental idea is that the 
frontline workers in government offices may modify or 
redefine agency policy to overcome day-to-day problems 
encountered with clients. Smith and Lipsky [42] extended 
their prediction on the frontline workers’ behaviour to non-
profit organizations, particularly those agencies processing 
clients’ information. They predicted that the frontline 
workers are the new street level bureaucrats that are likely 
to apply their personal discretion in determining benefits 
and opportunities for their clients. The application of 
discretion by the frontline workers triggers the way policy 
is implemented at the bottom in the non-profit community 
organizations. This situation is referred to by Lipsky [23, 
24, 25, 26] and Smith and Lipsky [42]) as inevitable. It 
raises an essential question for the researcher of whether or 
not the frontline workers in the non-profit community 
organizations behave as predicted by [42] Smith and 
Lipsky in providing welfare services to the needy 
communities. 
A few scholars like Goodsell [14], Meadow and 
Menkel-Meadow [34], Finlay [11], Keiser and Soss [21], 
Kaler [22] have analysed critically the Lipsky’s model of 
behaviour of the street level bureaucrats. They applied 
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Lipsky’s street level bureaucracy principles to study 
various programs in the public agencies that provide child 
support program, food stamps, Medicaid, and AFDC, 
medical residencies, and community based family planning 
in Kenya. Based on these scholars’ research, workers’ 
behaviours have been examined without distinguishing the 
entity of the organizations as either public or non-profit. 
The gap displayed in these scholars’ research allows this 
article to further analyse the workers’ behaviours, 
specifically in the non-profit organizations. This study is 
important to the bottom-up policy implementation 
approach, as workers are viewed as mediators of policy to 
people. As their roles and actions augment the policy 
process, assessing the implications of their discretion is 
vital to understand the framework of top-down and bottom-
up approaches. 
The involvements of the non-profit community 
organizations in providing welfare services are supported 
legally by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. This act 
legitimized the War on Poverty program declared by 
President Lyndon Johnson in 1964 and it was a crucial step 
in combating poverty nationally [4, 13, 30, 31]. The 
philosophy behind the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 
addressed the need to redistribute the existing wealth to the 
poor and to provide opportunities for the needy to earn a 
decent living and to maintain their families at a comfortable 
living standard.5 The War on Poverty program was 
administered by the federal Office of Economic 
Opportunity to set standards, procedures and eligibility 
guidelines. This policy also adopted a coordinated approach 
to alleviate the causes of poverty by concentrating on 
several major provisions as outlined in Title I through Title 
V.6
As the strategy is centered on providing opportunities 
and developing skills through education and training, this 
legislation emphasizes a strong collaboration among the 
federal, state and local governments. A combination of 
intergovernmental resources is fundamental, as the War on 
Poverty is viewed as a national issue. Besides this 
cooperation, the War on Poverty legislation has encouraged 
the community organizations to participate in helping the 
government to combat poverty as stipulated in Title II of 
the Urban and Rural Community Action Programs of the 
Economic Opportunity Act [3, 18, 32]. Title II of the bill 
also authorizes the federal financial assistance to 
community action programs as well as giving technical 
advice. Programs must be developed and conducted at a 
community level to combat poverty. This is based on the 
belief that local citizens understand their communities best 
and they will initiate ideas, resources, and sustain good 
leadership. Furthermore, Title II of the bill recognizes the 
need for community programs to be varied and flexible in 
their approaches in order to meet the local needs and 
interests. Therefore, programs may be developed in urban 
and rural areas or wherever poverty is found. 
 
                                                          
5 Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, 1965¬1968 
(Washington D.C., 1969) Vol. 11, pp. 650. 
6 Economic Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 
Stat. 508 (pp. 2900-2911). 
Financial assistance under the Title II is made 
available to organizations that show concrete progress 
toward combating poverty and causes of poverty. 
Organizations that are competent to implement such 
programs could be the public or private agencies or a 
combination of both that has the resources or capacity to 
develop, coordinate and operate an effective community 
action program. This title directly encourages maximum 
community participation in order to reach individuals who 
are in need. Community organizations are selected strictly 
to ensure that the chosen community agencies possess the 
ability and capacity to implement poverty programs 
successfully. 
 
3. Bottom-up Implementation: A Case of West Java 
Provincial Government 
 
Policy design and implementation are tasks of policy and 
political problem solving that are subject to a variety of 
pressures. As a process policy design identifies feasible 
options and analyzes the cost and impacts of such options. 
Thus it can be said public policy gives the course of action 
and structure implementation. 
After reformation, the trends in Indonesia improving 
welfare program design has mostly been guided by block 
grand budget policies/strategies. In a case study 
implementation improving basic welfare program in West 
Java, Lipsky analysis raises some concerns mainly 
administrative accountability system. Regulation and the 
accountability in program activities in Indonesia must take 
accountability based on Acta No. 15 Year 2004 
Pemeriksaan Pengelolaan dan Pertanggungjawaban 
Keuangan Negara (Financial Management and 
Accountability of State), Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri 
(PERMENDAGRI/Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation) 
No. 13 tahun 20067
The implementation in Indonesia, Lipsky research 
could result in the effect of outside force causing case such 
as national administration, even corruption. Lipsky study 
also raises the question of mainly associated with the 
 on Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah 
(Regional Financial Management) and the amendments a 
clarify that the provisions of implementation activities 
should follow the order of the administrative order, order 
implementation and the order accountability. Furthermore, 
bottom-up approach has resulted in other problems such as 
corruption cases such as described [45] explained that the 
decentralization in Indonesia have an impact in the form of 
decentralized corruption, the rules implemented by the 
central committee the committee local eager to get 'illegal 
budget' and the spreading money politics for the 
consolidation of gangsters (predators). Hadiz [45] added 
that the case in Indonesia is are not unique enough, it can 
be found in many cases in various countries that offer 
programs with predator’s democracy and decentralization 
as key players (eg is the best example is a post-Soviet 
regime, besides the Philippines and the Thailand). 
                                                          
7 http://www.kemendagri.go.id/produk-hukum  
                               Teten AM Engkun                                                                             333 
Scientific Journal of PPI-UKM, Vol. 2. No. 7, 2015 
ISSN No. 2356 - 2536 
 
quality of the implementing policy actors. Whereas the case 
an investigated by Lipsky is differently the developed of 
the actor implementing the policy with developed countries 
such as Indonesia. The actors implementing quality policies 
that have some low abilities to concurrent reading of 
situation, would lead to prevent the operation of the base, 
thereby policy goals are unreachable. 
Hadiz [45] opinion supports arguments from Sadu 
Wasitiono [40] which said that the policy of 
decentralization in Indonesia besides autonomy increase 
'kings' smaller in the region, as well as increasing 
corruption. Another argument in was presented by 
Indonesia Governance Index (IGJ) that 80% of new 
autonomous regions in Indonesia have failed to implement 
policies and are not able to provide prosperity to its 
citizens. To make matters worse, since 2009 at least Rp. 50 
trillion, Indonesia budget has been spent as the budget for 
the creation new provinces.8
This reality is different from the study conducted 
Lipsky [23, 24, 25, 26] that “street level bureaucrats” 
determine the success of a program. The author conducted 
of research in West Java with the following programs: 
 
 
a. Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri 
(PNPM Mandiri) 
 
Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri 
(PNPM Mandiri/ National Community Empowerment 
Program) is the national level program purpose to reduction 
of poverty communities, particularly empowering 
community-based. The program design of the basic policy 
framework and a referral for the performance of poverty 
eradication programs based on community empowerment. 
PNPM Mandiri implemented through the harmonization 
and the development of the systems, mechanisms and the 
procedures which are authorized by the government 
program. The government gives guidance and the financing 
incentives to encourage initiative and the innovation 
communities in sustainable poverty reduction. The program 
design of the basic policy framework and a referral for the 
performance of poverty eradication programs based on 
community empowerment. PNPM Mandiri implemented 
through the harmonization and the development of the 
systems, mechanisms and the procedures which are 
authorized by the government program. The government 
gives guidance and the financing incentives to encourage 
initiative and the innovation communities in sustainable 
poverty reduction.  
Special programs are designed and implemented by 
the central government is unable to improve the welfare of 
society in general. Variety of constraints, particularly 
geographical, cultural and intervention in society interest 
groups (NGOs, journalists, bureaucrats, executives and the 
political interest groups or members of political parties) to 
be one of the problems encountered. It is associated with 
                                                          
8 http://wartakota.tribunnews.com/2014/10/14/80-persen-daerah-otonomi-
baru-dob-gagal-sejahterakan-rakyat. 
the process of program planning and the implementation of 
programs are very top-down, too bureaucratic and the 
subordinate administrator only as the technical tasks based 
on the guidelines that have been set. Based on data from the 
High Court of West Java (2013) there were 72 cases of 
corruption of the Village Head in custody because of a 
change in the basic mechanisms of implementation the 
program. 
This is different with the opinions Smith and Lipsky 
[42] that argue there are several important variables related 
to the study of frontline workers and the prediction on the 
new street-level bureaucrats in the non-profit organizations. 
Smith and Lispky [42] developed their theory on the new 
street level bureaucrats in the non-profit organizations and 
their prediction emphasized rigid work environments that 
encouraged workers to exercise discretion. Factors such as 
insufficient funds, shortages of staff, mounting paperwork, 
ambiguous and voluminous rules, and conflicting agency 
goals are reasons for the new street level bureaucrats in the 
non-profit organizations to exercise personal discretion. A 
worker’s personal discretion was manifested through 
rationing and routinizing that led to bias, inequality and 
discrimination in delivering services to clients. 
Additionally, reasons for such outcomes were due to 
workers in non-profits organizations receiving low wages, 
few benefits, and facing job insecurity. Consequently, these 
conditions discouraged the workers from being loyal to the 
organizations and undermined their commitment toward 
delivering good services to clients [42]. Therefore, Smith 
and Lipsky [42] assumed that discouraging work conditions 
affect workers’ commitments that will in turn lead to bias, 
inequality, and discrimination in their services to the 
clients. 
 
b. Program DAKABALAREA (Dahareun loba, kabeuli 
ku balarea, barudak tetep sakola, lanjutkeun 
reformasi, anu iman nambahan) 
 
DAKABALAREA program means the program is to get 
people need to eat, can buy basic needs, the children can go 
to school regularly and the continue the reform process to 
enhance the piety of faith to Allah/God. Literally, this 
program a purpose to interest along with the decision to 
give micro-entrepreneurs credit and the small businesses 
with a pattern of results. The program was established and 
the commenced with the trisukses principle : the successful 
distribution with the purpose of conveying to the right 
target, the right level of needs and the meet the determined 
requirements, should provide the benefits biggest most 
hearty and can attempt to develop the recipient and 
successfully return of the funds is a trust that must be 
returned loans instead of grants, the return should be timely 
and the accurate number because applicants have to wait 
for another credit (rolling system). Trisukses are designed 
in the program until the end of 2010 does not run properly. 
Only one success of the successful distribution that nearly 
all channelled to the community budget. But the reality in 
the field level, many of the planned budget so a revolving 
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between citizens apparently be used for business capital the 
kindred management organizations program. 
This is different from Smith and Lipsky [42] which 
predicted that ambiguous and voluminous rules lead 
workers to exercise personal discretion by modifying rules 
through ration and routine that result in depriving clients’ 
access to benefits and services. Although workers admitted 
that unrealistic guidelines and rules exist, the elements of 
lobbying, advocating, and attempting to work around the 
issues showed different results from [42]. 
Smith and Lipsky [42] criticized rules and guidelines 
limit workers from delivering services to needy people on 
several essential issues with regards to income guidelines, 
job manuals, definitions for homelessness, and food stamp 
requirements. Despite these limitations that impede 
worker’s abilities to deliver their services to needy people, 
they attempt to work around the issues with the intention of 
making sure that needy people get what they deserve. 
Workers’ efforts, such as becoming a representative for 
their clients to the DTA office and advocating for their 
clients’ rights to services, are important to be recognized. 
Their efforts also show their seriousness in helping clients, 
and their roles as community service workers who 
professionally dedicate themselves to helping the needy 
people. 
While the programs that are bottom up rather than the 
central government and the provincial government is 
PNPM Mandiri and the DAKABALAREA Program. The 
program almost successful in the implementation stage, but 
there are barriers such as limited resources executive 
bureaucrats to understand the message of the policy 
makers. Number of overlapping regulations in the 
administrative system of reporting thereby the bureaucrats 
are afraid to make a basic implementation, the intervention 
of other parties, such as interest groups and the political 
groups that exploit them for interest his party. This is 
parallel with Edward III (1980) the argument that the 
failure of policy implementation is often the case, one only 
due to insufficient staff or employees, or incompetent in 
this field thereby not to understand the meaning of the 
public policy purpose. Although the results are expected to 
be good enough freedom to implement policies at the level 
below to make base used by the various interests involved, 
as was argued by (Turner and the Humle, 1997). 
 
4. Bottom-up Implementation Issues in West Java 
 
The use bottom-up implementation synonymous with actor 
or “bureaucrat” has been applied in many contexts. 
Interestingly one may argue that when Lipsky [23-26] first 
labelled frontline workers as “street-level bureaucrats,” he 
was referring to the public officials that exercised personal 
discretion in dealing with clients directly in daily work. 
Lipsky viewed workers at the bottom as bureaucrats 
because they were public officials too, like their top- level 
bureaucratic colleagues. Furthermore, this does not 
conclude that “bureaucrat” necessarily carries any negative 
connotation such as delay or rigidity. 
In fact, the Weberian model of bureaucracy is 
rational, centralized and objectively determinant. Thus this 
Weberian model promotes the essence of rationality in 
approaching human decisions, goals, accomplishments, 
tasks applications, environmental selection based on scarce 
resources and the ability to resolve issues embedded in 
organizations. Parsons [38] observed that Weber has 
formulated his organizational theory in the systematic 
approach that is concentrated overwhelmingly on 
normative patterns of rationality. In this way an 
organization’s efficiency can be achieved through 
discipline and reliability in exercising control over human 
beings [38]. This hierarchical model enhances an 
organization’s efficiency through a systematic division of 
labour, discipline and control, organized rules and 
regulations, competent administrative conditions, qualified 
candidates, and a standard system of rewards. Therefore, 
this bureaucratic administration in an organization results 
in the essential qualities of efficiency, formality, rationality, 
calculability, knowledge ability and technical competency. 
Daft and Steers [6] argued that while this bureaucratic 
model might be needed in large-sized organizations where 
a central system is able to bring together a large number of 
people and tasks to achieve organizational goals, for 
smaller organizations, adversarial bureaucratic procedures 
are unnecessary because tasks can be supervised or 
accomplished by a single or a few individuals. In fact, 
bureaucratic procedures such as standardizing, regulating, 
monitoring, and controlling may reduce flexibility and slow 
productivity and efficiency for small size organizations. 
Therefore, the question of whether or not bureaucracy 
promotes high performance is a matter of size and fit [6]. 
Having bureaucratic procedures may be vital for 
organizations as they expand in size, employees, tasks, and 
networks, but too much of bureaucracy may disrupt simple 
functions in a small-scaled organization. 
Furthermore, Hummel [20] argued that Weber’s 
intention to create a bureaucratic system through division 
of labour, specialization, training and hierarchy of duties is 
to maintain control and to produce stability and 
productivity. However, Weber’s bureaucracy has 
unintentional effects: hierarchical authority leads to a 
powerful centralized system that distorts training, 
specialization, division of labour and rewards. One extreme 
result may be to reduce stability and productivity. 
Therefore, bureaucracy is open to many interpretations and 
it is up to individuals to balance fit with function. 
The use of scientific management in a rational top-
down bureaucratic model has been criticized by bottom-up 
scholars like Lipsky [23-26], Lipsky and Weatherly [27], 
Elmore [8, 9], Weatherly [46], Hjern [15], Hjern and Porter 
[16]. Lipsky’s [23-26] street level bureaucracy theory was 
revolutionary in late 1960s because it introduced the idea of 
looking at the implementation processes from the bottom-
up in contrast to the rational top- down approach. Lipsky 
was concerned with the low level public employees who 
utilized the discretionary nature of their jobs to wield 
substantial power and in effect create policy for their 
agency. This term has been defined by Smith and Lipsky 
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[42] to designate contractual regimes, where non-profit 
organizations that receive grants from the government will 
have workers that behave similarly to public officials. A 
simple reason is that the non-profit organizations have to 
comply with government’s rules and standards that shape 
work ethics among workers. Thus work ethic is assumed to 
be similar for both the public officials and the street level 
bureaucrats, who may also ration and routine work that can 
result in bias, inequality and discrimination. 
The case of the implementation program in West Java, 
the authorities granted to “street-level bureaucrats,” is not 
optimal. This may result in abuse of power, corruption 
affects failure to achieve objectives of the program. The 
failure of PNPM Mandiri and DAKABALAREA program 
is just another instance besides are still many other fails 
programs. The low quality mental is the resource of 
bureaucrats become one of a major obstacle in the 
decentralization of the government authority from above to 
the bottom. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The rules and guidelines designed for the welfare programs 
are avenues to ensure that limited resources are utilized to 
achieve goals and to alleviate poverty by distributing 
resources and services to help needy people. Further 
recognition is that rules and guidelines are ways to assess 
standard eligibility, to allow consistency in decision 
making, and to provide solutions for anticipated outcomes. 
As these formal rules and guidelines are codes of action 
that are determined by the top level decision makers, they 
are presumed to be followed. These rules remain as a 
standard procedure that applies to all, but rules and 
guidelines can be modified at the bottom based on agency 
expertise and personal discretionary power. 
The actual policy rules and guidelines are modified at 
the bottom when immediate needs and emergency cases 
require expertise to decide what is doable and what is the 
best that fits in such circumstances. In fact, The case of the 
implementation program in West Java, the authorities 
granted to “street-level bureaucrats,” is not optimal. This 
may result in abuse of power, corruption affects failure to 
achieve objectives of the program. The failure of PNPM 
Mandiri and DAKABALAREA program is just another 
instance besides are still many other fails programs. The 
low quality mental is the resource of bureaucrats become 
one of a major obstacle in the decentralization of the 
government authority from above to the bottom. 
This proves the importance of policy design that 
provided explicit policy directives, clear statements of 
administrative responsibilities, and more direct actions with 
fewer veto points. A top-down model of six variables 
linking policy to performance included 
standards/objectives, resources, inter-organizational 
communications, characteristics of implementing agencies, 
economic/social/political conditions, and implementer 
"dispositions" [44]. 
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